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 Does Education Make Voters 
More Leftist or More Rightist? 
A West vs. East Cross-Regional Analysis* 
 
FLORIN N. FEŞNIC, OANA I. ARMEANU 
 
 
 
Fifty years ago, Lipset observed general phenomenon of democratic 
politics: parties were “primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle 
and upper classes”1, with the right as the party of the haves and the left as the 
party of have-nots. Is this phenomenon equally true today? Do elections 
continue to be “a democratic translation of the class struggle”? If the answer is 
yes, is it equally applicable to post-industrial countries with well-established 
credentials, and emerging democracies, such as those from the post-Communist 
region? Or does the answer have to be nuanced from one region to another? Last, 
but not least, did the meaning of class itself change in any way in recent years? 
Scholars have shown that economic and social changes in post-industrial 
nations are reflected in their politics, with the “new politics” of post-material 
concerns increasingly competing with the “old politics” of class and purely 
material interests2. The left side of the political spectrum in these polities is now 
dominated by a cosmopolitan and libertarian “new left”. On the other hand, in 
Eastern Europe, the effect of lesser development in conjunction with political 
and institutional legacies is that, for the time being, political life is dominated 
by a rather conservative, authoritarian and nationalist “old left”3. 
Our research adds to the abovementioned findings in two ways. The vast 
majority of studies so far are cross-sectional; therefore, they cannot give a direct 
measure of the magnitude of change. Moreover, there are few cross-regional 
                                                 
*  This research was supported by a CNCS-UEFISCDI grant, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-
2011-3-0669 („Change and Stability in Romanian Electoral Behaviour, 2009-2014”). 
1
  Seymour Martin LIPSET, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Doubleday, New 
York, 1960, p. 230. 
2
  Ronald INGLEHART, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and 
Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997; Herbert 
KITSCHELT, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1994. 
3
  Milada VACHUDOVA, Liesbet HOOGHE, “Postcommunist Politics in a Magnetic Field: 
How Transition and EU Accession Structure Party Competition on European Integration”, 
Comparative European Politics, vol. 7, no. 2, 2009, pp. 179-212. 
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comparisons that look at both post-industrial democracies and lesser developed, 
emerging democracies. Our study does just that. We focus on the demand side, 
and we analyze the changes in the sociological and ideological profile of the 
electorate of mainstream left in a post-industrial democracy (France), and a 
post-communist democracy (Romania) during the last two decades. 
 
 
 
POST-INDUSTRIALISM, POST-COMMUNISM, 
AND SUPPORT FOR LEFT: WEST VS. EAST 
 
 
Up until the 1960’s, democratic politics was dominated almost 
exclusively by class conflicts, so “all political questions [were reducible] to 
their bearing upon one crucial issue: how much government intervention in the 
economy should there be?”4. Socialist and social-democratic parties were, at 
that time, more radical in terms of economic policies they endorsed, which 
made them less palatable for middle-class voters’ taste. Things started to change 
in the following decades. Mainstream left parties became more moderate, and 
“conservative socialism” became the dominant ideology of major parties in 
Western democracies5. 
We believe that the most telling indicator of this ideological drift is the 
extent of change experienced by left-wing parties – whether, and to what extent, 
the constituents and ideology of these parties have indeed become “new left”; 
thus, we study changes in the profile of left constituencies in Eastern and 
Western Europe. Daniel Bell described a fundamental shift in the relation 
between class and power, with political position and technical skill becoming 
more important than wealth and property. According to Bell, the engine driving 
these structural changes is education, which “has become the major way to 
acquire the technical skills necessary for the administrative and power-wielding 
jobs in society”6. This makes a Weberian conceptualization of class, related to 
life chances, a more useful analytical device than its alternative, the narrower 
Marxian definition of class as merely a function of the relation to the means of 
production. Therefore, we decided to focus on education rather than class as a 
measure of socioeconomic status. 
                                                 
4
  Anthony DOWNS, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row, New York, 1957, p. 116. 
5
  Arend LIJPHART, Democracies’: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government 
in Twenty-One Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984, pp. 31-33. 
6
  Daniel BELL, “The Dispossessed”, in idem (ed), The Radical Right, Doubleday, New 
York, 1964, p. 21. 
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Education is not just a proxy for class, with better educated people having 
better incomes and jobs than people with less education. On the one hand, 
increased economic affluence in post-industrial democracies has worked 
primarily to the advantage of the right, since people who are better off tend to 
oppose redistribution. Yet on the other hand, another effect of increased 
affluence is that younger generations are better educated than the old ones. 
Better education makes people more tolerant and cosmopolitan, and this has 
benefited the moderate left7. This process is paralleled by a process of change of 
the meaning of Left and Right itself in political discourse8, with New Politics 
issues gaining increased salience. In recent years, the major cleavage in Western 
democracies is pitting a conservative right against a libertarian left9. 
In Eastern Europe, the main axis of party competition in Eastern Europe is 
orthogonal to that from Western Europe10. Survey data indicates that in the West 
the natural constituency of the New Left, post-materialists voters, are not too 
concerned about the extent of government ownership of industry; in Eastern Europe, 
post-materialists “are far more favorable than other groups to moving away from state 
ownership of business and industry”11. Therefore, the latter group is more inclined to 
support a libertarian right, rather than a libertarian left – though this kind of left 
is missing in most Eastern European countries anyway (see the Annex, Figure 1). 
Within the post-Communist region, an important explanatory variable for 
the differences between the types of left we see is what O’Donnell and 
Schmitter called the balance of power between hardliners and softliners prior to 
the transition to democracy12. In places where softliners had the upper hand, as 
it happened in Poland or Hungary, economic (and even political) reforms 
started before 1989; after the transition, the natural step for the former 
governing parties was to transform into genuine social-democratic parties, with 
an ideology and social base that resembles their Western counterparts. Where 
the government before the transition was dominated by hardliners, as it 
happened in Romania or Bulgaria, there were no reforms before 1989, and the 
successor parties had a much harder time overcoming the legacy of the past13. 
                                                 
7
  Ronald INGLEHART, Modernization and Postmodernization…cit., pp. 237-266. 
8
  Russell J. DALTON, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies, 4th ed., CQ Press, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 121. 
9
  Herbert KITSCHELT, The Transformation… cit. 
10
  IDEM, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe”, Politics and Society, vol. 20, 
no. 1, 1992, pp. 7-50; Gary MARKS, Liesbet HOOGHE, Moira NELSON, Erica EDWARDS, 
“Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, 
Same Causality”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 2, 2006, pp. 155-175. 
11
  Ronald INGLEHART, Modernization and Postmodernization… cit., p. 262. 
12
  Guillermo O’DONNELL, Philippe C. SCHMITTER, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, MD, 1986, Chapter 3. 
13
  M. Steven FISH, “The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist 
World”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1998, pp. 31-78. 
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Consequently, we develop a typology of dominant left-wing parties in the 
East and West, based on their ideology and constituents. On the one hand, we 
have Old Left parties such as the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD), 
which is still largely unreformed, paternalistic, conservative and authoritarian, a 
reflection of politics in a relatively underdeveloped post-Communist country, 
with a harsh regime before 1989. Romania is still less reformed than Poland, 
largely because the country was governed mostly by the Social Democrats, who 
were, and continue to be, rather lukewarm towards reforms. On the other hand, 
we have New Left parties such as the French Socialists and (especially) Greens, 
representative of the electoral alignments characteristic for an advanced post-
industrial nation. Then we have more ambiguous cases, like the Polish Socialists or 
the American Democratic Party. In the first case, the party and the Polish 
society itself have moved further toward modernization and reforms than their 
Romanian counterparts; at the same time, the country’s level of socioeconomic 
development, together with its relatively high conservatism, may explain why 
Polish Socialists do not look yet like a full-fledged New Left party – at least in 
terms of their constituency. The American society is also more conservative 
than other post-industrial nations14, and this explains why the Democratic Party 
is rather in-between an Old Left and a New Left position (see the Annex, Figure 2). 
Figure 2 confirms the above considerations. In Romania, electoral support 
for PSD in the 2000 parliamentary election drops from a 55 percent high among 
voters with elementary education or less to a 26 percent low among voters with 
higher education. In France we see the opposite pattern of support, with the vote 
for Jospin and Mamère in 2002 being about ten percentage points larger among 
voters with higher education than among voters with elementary education. 
 
 
 
MOVING (OR NOT) FROM “OLD POLITICS” 
TO “NEW POLITICS” 
 
 
What follows is a longitudinal analysis of data from several surveys of 
French and Romanian voters. This analysis will show that the profile of the 
electorate of the moderate left in France has changed significantly, shifting from 
an “old left” electorate in the late 1980’s to a “new left” electorate. However, 
there was little change in the profile of the constituents of Romania’s left which 
continues to be, as it was at the beginning of competitive elections in the early 
1990’s, an “old left” electorate. 
                                                 
14
  Ronald INGLEHART, Christian WELZEL, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: 
the Human Development Sequence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 65. 
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France: The Left Moves from “Old Politics” 
to “New Politics” 
 
If we look at France, we see that in the 1980’s, as indicated by a 1988 
survey, the less educated voters positioned themselves to the left of better 
educated voters – a pattern consistent with an “old politics” type of electoral 
alignment (see the Annex, Figure 3). 
The one partial exception to this general pattern, an exception for which 
we do not have a good explanation at this point, is that the most right-wing 
voters were not those with higher education, but those with a high school 
(baccalaureate) degree. Be that as it may, by 2002 the general pattern is reversed: 
the better educated voters position themselves in a more left-wing position than 
less educated voters, suggesting a shift from “old politics” to “new politics”. 
This shift was further reflected in partisan preferences. In Figure 4, we show 
partisan support for left in France as a function of education in 1988 and 2002, 
expressed as ratios (percent of vote for left within the group divided by the percent 
of vote for left in the whole electorate). A ratio larger than one indicates that the 
group is overrepresented in the electorate of the left, and a ratio smaller than one 
indicates that the group is underrepresented (see the Annex, Figure 4). 
We see a similar evolution as in Figure 3: in the late 1980s, the French 
moderate left had a predominantly “old politics” electorate, in which voters 
with little education were overrepresented. Currently, it has a “new politics” 
electorate, and well educated voters are now overrepresented. 
Finally, we may ask ourselves to what extent the ideology of this 
electorate is indeed a “new left” ideology. To answer this question, we used 
factor analysis15 of the 2002 survey data in order to obtain a two-dimensional 
mapping of the main partisan constituencies in France (see the Annex, Figure 5). 
What we see, without any need for rotating the solutions16 , are two 
clearly identifiable factors: an Old Politics factor, related to economic policies 
(profit, privatization), and a New Politics factor, related to xenophobia 
(agreement with the statements “there are too many immigrants” and “some 
races are better than others”), authoritarianism (support for the reintroduction of 
                                                 
15
  Factor analysis is a data reduction technique that explores correlations between a large 
number of variables (in this case, the survey questions) in order to reduce them to a 
smaller number of dimensions, called factors (here, the “Old Politics” and “New Politics” 
dimensions). If we see two uncorrelated factors emerging, and if the questions about 
economic questions have high loadings on one dimension, and the „political” questions 
have high loadings on the other dimension, then the hypothesis about the two-dimensional 
nature of competition is confirmed. 
16
  Typically, researchers use a technique called rotation, which makes the output more 
understandable and facilitates the interpretation of factors (David G. GARSON, 
“Statnotes: Factor Analysis”, http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/factor.htm, accessed 
December 1, 2008). We only used this technique for Romania; for France, the results 
were clear-cut, making the rotation unnecessary. 
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the death penalty) and moral conservatism (negative views of homosexuality). 
The greatest distance along the first dimension is that between Communist 
voters on the left and liberal voters on the right; the second dimension separates 
especially the archetypal New Politics constituencies, Greens and voters of the 
National Front. If we look at the average policy position of voters grouped by 
education, our expectations are confirmed. Better educated voters are indeed 
more rightist on economic policies compared to less educated voters, though 
only marginally so. But the distance between these groups is much larger along 
the second dimension, where voters with higher education are in the same 
position as Green voters, and voters with elementary education are located close 
to the average position of extreme right-wing voters. 
 
 
Romanian Left: Trapped in “Old Politics” 
 
For almost twenty years, since the very beginning of competitive elections in 
post-Communist Romania, the Social Democratic Party had a monopoly over 
the left side of the political landscape in Romania (albeit it presented itself under 
various names). Whether by deliberate choice or because of structural constraints 
(we suspect it is a mix of both), the party started in an Old Left position in 1990 
and has remained there ever since. One telling proof is the speech delivered on 
December 13, 2004 by the former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, the candidate 
of the Social Democratic Party to the presidency of Romania, in which he 
acknowledged his defeat. According to Năstase, the profile of his constituency 
was primarily rural, old, and poor, a constituency in need of more than just help 
for development – it was a constituency in need for help to survive17. 
Figure 6 (see the Annex) illustrates the substantial impact of regional 
development on electoral support for the candidate of the left in the first round of 
that particular election. In the more developed counties, where about three out of 
every four inhabitants has access to piped water, Năstase captured only about 
one-third of the total vote. In the less developed counties, where the vast majority 
of the population does not have access to piped water, Năstase won a majority, 
approaching 60 percent of the total vote in the poorest counties. Then it should come 
as no surprise that Romanian have-nots continue to identify with, and vote for, the left. 
The data in Figure 7 (see the Annex) confirms that this is indeed the case. 
Less educated voters continue to place themselves in a more left-wing position 
than the average Romanian voter, as they did in the early 1990’s. As a matter of 
                                                 
17
  “Rezultatul votului […] arată că, în prezent, există două Românii. În primul rând, este 
vorba de o Românie urbană în creştere, cu o solidă componentă liberală, […] care aşteaptă 
de la stat mai degrabă şanse decât sprijin; aceasta este România care l-a votat pe Traian 
Băsescu. Dar mai există şi o Românie rurală, cu oameni în vârstă şi oameni săraci, care 
are încă nevoie de ajutor nu doar pentru dezvoltare, ci şi pentru supravieţuire; aceşti 
oameni au avut încredere în mine.” (Adrian NĂSTASE, “Vom sprijini proiectele lui 
Traian Băsescu”, Revista 22, vol. 14, no. 771, December 16-23, 2004). 
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fact, the distance between the left-right self-positioning of voters with little 
education on the left and that of voters with higher education on the right has 
increased. This continuity is further reflected in voting patterns. The strong and 
negative correlation between education and support for left is as visible today as 
it was in the early 1990s. The voters with little education continue to be 
overrepresented in the electorate of the Romanian SDP, while the voters with 
good education continue to be underrepresented (see the Annex, Figure 8). 
How well are these patterns of electoral support matched by the policy 
positions of various constituencies? To answer this question, as in the case of 
France, we use factor analysis of survey data to map Romania’s most important 
partisan constituencies, as well as social and demographic subgroups (as a 
function of education, age, and residence, urban or rural) 
What we see in Figure 9 (see the Annex) is that there are important 
similarities, but also equally important differences, between Romania and 
France. It is immediately apparent that the main line of cleavage in Romania is 
indeed orthogonal to France’s main alignment, with the moderate right-wing 
constituency being more liberal (politically, that is) than the constituents of the 
Social Democratic Party. Another important difference is that the first 
dimension, related to economic policies, appears more important the second, the 
opposite of what we saw in France, another indication that, unlike in France, 
Romania’s political life continues to be dominated by Old Politics conflicts (we 
compared the eigenvalues of the two dimensions in each case as a proxies for 
the relative salience of the two dimensions). Last, but not least, there are important 
differences along both dimensions between the policy positions endorsed by 
voters with little educations and those of voters with good education. Overall, 
the data confirms the Old Politics image of the Romanians Social Democrats, a 
party based primarily on older, rural, poor voters with little education. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Our main goal in this paper was to analyze two cases, one from Western 
Europe (France), the other one from Eastern Europe (Romania), and test the 
“New Politics” vs. “Old Politics” theory, which predicts that the electoral 
alignments in the two regions are different: a libertarian left versus a 
conservative right in the West, a conservative left against a libertarian right in 
the East. A closely related point would be the expectation that better educated 
voters, i.e., the most libertarian and cosmopolitan segment of the electorate, 
would tend to favor the left in the West and the right in the East. 
Our longitudinal analysis of survey data confirmed these expectations. In 
France, the ideological landscape is unambiguously two-dimensional, and the second 
dimension separates most clearly Green voters from extreme right voters, as the 
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“New Politics” theory would predict. We saw how, in the last decades, the better 
educated voters have become more leftist, in terms of both their self-placement on the 
left-right continuum, as well voting. This is in spite of the fact that, if we look at the first 
dimension, voters with higher education are actually more right-wing than voters with 
less education. However, this appears to be more than compensated by the former 
group’s policy preferences on the second, “New Politics” dimension, which makes 
them the natural constituency for the left. France appears as a typical case of a post-
industrial nation, with a libertarian left that has a middle-class, well-educated constituency. 
In Romania, thing are very different. It is still a rather underdeveloped society, 
not only when compared with Western post-industrial nations like France, but even 
when compared to other post-Communist countries from Eastern Europe. World 
Bank data show that, while virtually all (99 percent) of Bulgaria’s rural population 
has access to improved water sources (and, moreover, this has been the case for 
more than two decades), in Romania this is still a distant goal (only 76 percent do so)18. 
This is in a country where 47 percent of the population continues to live in villages19, 
and urban-rural disparities are comparable to those found in many Third World countries. 
In one analysis of social underdevelopment in the Third World, Handelman noticed 
the gap between urban centers, where “at the close of past century, 72 percent of the 
population had access to proper home sanitation – and rural areas, where that figure 
fell to 20 percent”20 . That means a 52 percent gap between urban and rural. 
Although we do not have disaggregated figures for Romania, we believe a good 
proxy is the proportion of the population without access to running water. The 
numbers were 12.3 percent for urban and 84.3 percent for rural – a 72 percent gap21. 
Clearly, such major structural problems have political consequences. In 
spite of its membership in the Socialist International, the policies endorsed by 
the Romanian PSD are a far cry from those of the French Socialists, or even 
those of their Hungarian or Polish counterparts. The electorate of the PSD is 
also different from the electorate of those parties; PSD’s core constituency 
resemble more that of the Russian Communist Party, whose support “decreases 
with urbanization, educational level, and family income and increases with the 
voter’s age”22 As of now, we don’t see much evidence that the economic, social 
and political transformations of the last two decades, including Romania’s 
accession to the EU, are pushing the PSD away from its “Old Politics” position 
toward a “New Politics” position. 
                                                 
18
  World Bank, “World Development Indicators: Bulgaria”, http://data.worldbank.org/cou 
ntry/bulgaria#cp_wdi; “World Development Indicators: Romania”, http://data.worldbank. 
org/country/romania#cp_wdi; accessed April 11, 2014. 
19
  World Bank, “World Development Indicators: Urban Development”, http://data.worldban 
k.org/topic/urban-development; accessed April 11, 2014. 
20
  Howard HANDELMAN, The Challenge of Third World Development, Prentice Hall, 
Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2006, p. 8. 
21
  United Nations Development Programme, A Decade Later: Understanding the Transition 
Process in Romania. National Human Development Report Romania 2001-2002, UNDP, 
Bucureşti, 2003, p. 125. 
22
  Timothy J. COLTON, Transitional Citizens. Voters and What Influences Them in the New 
Russia. Cambridge, MA and London: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 78. 
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Figure 1. Linkages between Libertarian/Authoritarian and Market/Nonmarket 
Dimensions in Eastern and Western Europe 
 
 
Source: adapted from Herbert KITSCHELT, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central 
Europe”, Politics and Society, vol. 20, no. 1, 1992, p. 17. 
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Figure 2. Education and Vote for Left in Four Countries 
 
 
Romania: vote for the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in the November 2000 Senate election. 
Poland: vote for the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) – Labor Union (UP) coalition in the 
September 2001 election for the Sejm. 
US: vote for the Democratic candidate John Kerry in the November 2004 presidential election. 
France: vote for the Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin and the Green candidate Noël Mamère in 
the April 2002 presidential election. 
 
 
Data sources:  
Romania: IMAS 2000 parliamentary election exit poll data, <http://domino.kappa.ro/imas/hom 
e.nsf/HomeEng>, accessed January 15, 2001. 
Poland: Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Old and New Divisions in Polish Politics: Polish Parties’ Electoral 
Strategies and Bases of Support”, Europe Asia-Studies, vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 729-746 
(Table 2, p. 746). 
US: Larry SABATO, “The Election That Broke The Rules”, in IDEM (ed.), Divided States of America: 
The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, New 
York, 2006 (Table 3, p. 108). 
France: CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP. 2003. “Panel électoral français 2002” [Computer file]. Paris: 
Banque de Données Socio-Politiques – CIDSP. 
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Figure 3. Education and Left-Right Self-Positioning of Voters in France, 1998 and 2002 
 
 
Coding: 
“Elementary education”: mean scores for respondents with elementary education or less (“sans 
diplôme” or “Certificat d’Études Primaires”). 
“Vocational”: mean scores for respondents with vocational training (“Ancien brevet, B.E.P.C”, 
“Certificat d’aptitude professionnelle (CAP)”, “Brevet d’enseignement professionnel 
(BEP)”, or “BAC d’enseignement technique ou professionnel”). 
“High school”: mean scores for respondents with a “general” baccalaureate degree or some 
college (“BAC d’enseignement general”, “BAC + 2 ans ou niveau BAC + 2 ans”). 
“Higher education”: mean score for respondents with a university degree (“Diplôme de 
l’enseignement supérieur (2ème ou 3ème cycles, grande école)”). 
“Electorate” – the mean score for the entire sample. 
 
 
Source: results computed by authors using the following datasets: 
Roy PIERCE, “French Presidential Election Survey” [Computer file], ICPSR version, Ann Arbor, 
MI, 1988. 
CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP, “Panel électoral français 2002” [Computer file], Banque de Données 
Socio-Politiques – CIDSP, Paris, 2003. 
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Figure 4. Education and Electoral Support for Moderate Left Presidential 
Candidates in France, 1988 and 2002 (Ratios) 
 
Note: the ratio is computed by dividing the support for left within a certain educational group by 
the support for left in the population as a whole. A ratio larger than 1.0 indicates a higher 
level of support within that group compared to the population as a whole, and a ratio 
lower than 1.0 indicates a lower level of support. 
For example, the first column on the left corresponds to a ratio of 1.12, obtained by dividing 56.8 
percent (the total vote intention for moderate left candidates in the first round of the 1988 
French presidential election) by 52.5 percent (the vote intention for the same candidates in 
the whole French electorate). 
The data refers to the moderate left candidates in the 1988 and 2002 elections. We followed the 
typical approach of French scholars, who distinguish between “extreme left” (Workers’ 
Struggle, Revolutionary Communist League, Workers’ Party) and “moderate left” 
(Communists, Socialists, Greens, Radicals), and we only looked at the latter. 
In 1988, this included François Mitterrand (Socialist), André Lajoinie (Communist), Antoine 
Waechter (Green), and Pierre Juquin (Communist splinter). 
In 2002, the moderate left candidates included Lionel Jospin (Socialist), Jean-Pierre Chevènement 
(Citizens’ Movement), Noël Mamère (Green), Robert Hue (Communist), and Christiane 
Taubira (Left Radicals). 
 
 
Source: ratios computed by authors using the following datasets: 
Roy PIERCE, “French Presidential Election Survey” [Computer file], ICPSR version, Ann Arbor, 
MI, 1988. 
CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP, “Panel électoral français 2002” [Computer file], Banque de Données 
Socio-Politiques – CIDSP, Paris, 2003. 
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Figure 5. Two-Dimensional Policy Mapping of Partisan Constituencies in France. 
Factor Analysis of 2002 Survey Data (Unrotated Solutions) 
 
 
Questions: 
“Political interest” – Q 3, “Est-ce que vous vous intéressez à la politique ?”. 
“Too many immigrants in France” – Q 39.2, “Il y a trop d’immigrés en France”. 
“Homosexuality not ok” – Q 39.4, “L’homosexualité est une manière acceptable de vivre sa sexualité”. 
“Reintroduce the death penalty” – Q 39.5, “Il faudrait rétablir la peine de mort”. 
“Some races better” – Q 39.7, “Il y a des races moins douées que d’autres”. 
“Abandon EU” – Q 57, “Si l’on annonçait demain que l’Union européenne est abandonnée, 
éprouveriez vous de grands regrets, ou un vif soulagement?”. 
“Profit” and “privatization” – Attitudes toward profit (Q 59.7) and privatization (Q 59.8): 
“Pouvez-vous me dire, pour chacun de ces mots, s’il évoque pour vous quelque chose de 
très positif, d’assez positif, d’assez négatif ou de très négatif ?”. 
“Democracy works” – Q 6, “Diriez-vous qu'en France la démocratie fonctionne très bien, assez 
bien, pas très bien ou pas bien du tout?”. 
We saved the scores for the two factors as new variables, and then computed the mean score for 
each constituency or social group mapped in the graph. 
Constituencies: mean scores for the voters of each major presidential candidate. 
 
Groups: 
“18-29”, “30-45”, “46-59”, “60+”: mean scores for the voters aged 18-29, 30-45, 46-59, and over 
60, respectively. 
“Elementary education”: mean scores for respondents with elementary education or less (“sans 
diplôme” or “Certificat d’Études Primaires”; score 1 or 2 for Q 111B, “Quel est le 
diplôme le plus élevé que vous ayez obtenu?”). 
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“Vocational”: mean scores for respondents with vocational training (“Ancien brevet, B.E.P.C”, 
“Certificat d’aptitude professionnelle (CAP)”, “Brevet d’enseignement professionnel 
(BEP)”, or “BAC d’enseignement technique ou professionnel” – scores 3, 4, 5, and 6 for 
Q111B). 
“High school”: mean scores for respondents with a “general” baccalaureate degree or some 
college (“BAC d’enseignement general”, “BAC + 2 ans ou niveau BAC + 2 ans” – scores 
7 or 8 for Q111B). 
“Higher education”: mean score for respondents with a university degree (“Diplôme de 
l’enseignement supérieur (2ème ou 3ème cycles, grande école)” – score 9 for Q111B. 
 
 
Source: data analysis performed by authors using the following dataset: 
CEVIPOF/CIDSP/CECOP, “Panel électoral français 2002” [Computer file], Banque de Données 
Socio-Politiques – CIDSP, Paris, 2003. 
We obtained the factors using the principal components method (in SPSS). 
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Figure 6. Regional Underdevelopment and Support for Left in the First Round of the 2004 
Presidential Election in Romania 
 
 
Source: computed by authors using data from 
BIROUL ELECTORAL CENTRAL (Central Electoral Commission), “Preşedinte – Voturi Valabil 
exprimate pe circumscripţii electorale”, http://www.bec2004.ro/rezultate.htm, accessed 
March 26, 2008; 
UNDP ROMANIA, A Decade Later: Understanding the Transition Process in Romania. National 
Human Development Report Romania 2001-2002, UNDP, 2003 (Table 4, p. 131). 
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Figure 7. Education and Left-Right Self-Positioning of Voters in Romania, 1993 and 2006 
 
 
Source: computed by authors using the following datasets: 
ICCV (Institutul de Cercetare a Calităţii Vieţii/the Institute for the Study of the Quality of Life), 
“Valori fundamentale europene − 1993” (“European Values, 1993”) [computer file], 
RODA (Arhiva Română de Date Sociale/Romanian Social Data Archive), Bucureşti, 2003; 
THE FOUNDATION FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY, “Barometrul de Opinie Publică octombrie 
2006” (Public Opinion Barometer, October 2006 wave) [computer file], 2006, available at 
http://www.fundatia.ro/?q=node/1303. 
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Figure 8. Education and Electoral Support for Left in Romania, 1992-93 and 2006 (Ratios) 
 
See Figure 4 for an explanation of how we computed the ratios. 
1992-93: the survey was carried in 1993, but the question referred to the respondents’ vote in the 
1992 parliamentary election. We considered as “left vote” a vote for PDSR. 
2006: the question was “If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, how would you vote?”. 
We considered as left voters those responders who declared that they would vote for the PSD. 
 
 
Source: computed by authors using the following datasets: 
ICCV (Institutul de Cercetare a Calităţii Vieţii/the Institute for the Study of the Quality of Life), 
“Valori fundamentale europene – 1993” (“European Values, 1993”) [computer file], RODA 
(Arhiva Română de Date Sociale/Romanian Social Data Archive), BucureŞti, 2003; 
THE FOUNDATION FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY, “Barometrul de Opinie Publică octombrie 
2006” (Public Opinion Barometer, October 2006 wave) [computer file], 2006, available at 
http://www.fundatia.ro/?q=node/1303. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does Education Make Voters More Leftist or More Rightist? A West vs. East Cross-Regional Analysis 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIV  no. 1  2014 
45 
"Old Politics" (Factor 1; eigenvalue = 2.4)
.8.6.4.20-.2-.4-.6
"
N
ew
 
Po
lit
ic
s"
 
(F
ac
to
r 
2;
 
ei
ge
n
v
al
u
e 
=
 
1.
5)
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6
rural
urban
higher education
high school
vocational
elementary
60+
45-59
30-44
18-29
Left (PSD)Ext "right" (PRM)
"Populist" (PNG)
Right (PNL/PD/DA)
strong leader
order
nationalismreligionhomosexuality
state intervention
inequality
freedom
Communism
democracy
Left Right
Li
be
rt
ar
ia
n
A
u
th
o
rit
ar
ia
n
 
 
“Old Politics” (Factor 1 – eigenvalue 2.4) 
 
Figure 9. Two-Dimensional Policy Mapping of Partisan Constituencies in Romania. 
Factor Analysis of 2006 Survey Data (Rotated Solutions) 
 
 
Questions: 
“Communism”: whether the respondent thinks Communism is a good thing (COM1. “După 
părerea dumneavoastră, comunismul...?”). 
“Democracy”: we used a question about multipartyism as a proxy for pro-democratic values 
(respondents favoring a political system with two or more parties) versus anti-democratic 
values (respondents favoring a political system with one party or no political parties): 
PP17. „Dvs. credeţi că ar fi mai bine ca în România...?” 
“Freedom”: whether the respondent thinks freedom is more important than equality (V9, 
“Egalitatea este mai importantă decât libertatea” versus “Libertatea este mai importantă 
decât egalitatea”). 
“Homosexuality”: whether the respondent is in favor of a law against homosexuality (V19.1. 
“Homosexualitatea trebuie interzisă prin lege”). 
“Inequality”: what the respondent think about income inequality (is it good or bad?); V10, 
“Diferenţele între venituri ar trebui să fie mai mici”, versus “Diferenţele între venituri ar 
trebui să fie mai mari pentru a încuraja efortul individual”. 
“Order”: whether the respondent agrees with the statement that order is more important than 
individual freedom (V21.2, “Păstrarea ordinii publice este mai importantă decât respectarea 
libertăţii individuale”). 
“Religion”: whether the respondent favors the compulsory teaching of religion in public schools 
(V19.10. « În şcolile de stat orele de religie trebuie să fie obligatorii”). 
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“State intervention”: the respondent’s position on the issue of state versus individual 
responsibility for individual welfare (V12, “Statul ar trebui să îşi asume mai multă 
responsabilitate pentru bunăstarea fiecăruia” versus “Fiecare individ ar trebui să îşi asume 
mai multă responsabilitate pentru propria bunăstare”). 
“Strong leader”: whether the respondent agrees with the notion that Romania needs a strong leader 
(V21.4, “România are nevoie de un conducător puternic, care să facă ordine în ţară”). 
We saved the scores for the two factors as new variables, and then computed the mean score for 
each constituency or social group mapped in the graph. 
Constituencies: mean scores for the would-be voters of the major parties and political alliances at 
the moment when the survey was carried (October 2006); UDMR (the Hungarian Democratic 
Union) was excluded from the analysis. 
 
 
Groups: 
“18-29”, “30-45”, “46-59”, “60+”: mean scores for the voters aged 18-29, 30-45, 46-59, and over 
60, respectively. 
“Elementary”: mean scores for respondents with less than vocational education. 
“Vocational”: mean scores for respondents who finished a vocational school (“şcoala profesională”). 
“High school”: mean scores for respondents with a high school degree (“liceu”) but less than 
higher education. 
“Higher education”: mean scores for respondents with a higher education degree (“facultate”). 
 
Source: computed by authors using the following dataset: 
THE FOUNDATION FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY, “Barometrul de Opinie Publică octombrie 
2006” (Public Opinion Barometer, October 2006 wave) [computer file], 2006, available at 
http://www.fundatia.ro/?q=node/1303. 
We obtained the factors using the principal components method with Varimax rotation (in SPSS). 
